A well-known result of Cleve shows that complete fairness is impossible, in general, without an honest majority. Somewhat surprisingly, Gordon et al. recently showed that certain (nontrivial) functions can be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting. Motivated by their result, we show here the first completely-fair protocols (for non-trivial functions) in the multi-party setting. Specifically, we show that boolean OR can be computed fairly for any number of parties n, and that voting can be computed fairly for n = 3 (in each case, we tolerate an arbitrary number of corruptions). Our protocol for voting requires ω(log k) rounds, where k is the security parameter, and we prove this is optimal if complete fairness is desired.
Introduction
In the setting of secure computation, a set of parties wish to run a protocol for computing some function of their inputs while preserving, to the extent possible, security properties such as privacy, correctness, input independence and others. These requirements are formalized by comparing a real-world execution of the protocol to an ideal world where there is a trusted entity who performs the computation on behalf of the parties. Informally, a protocol is "secure" if for any real-world adversary A there exists a corresponding ideal-world adversary S (corrupting the same parties as A) such that the result of executing the protocol in the real world with A is computationally indistinguishable from the result of computing the function in the ideal world with S.
One desirable property is fairness which, intuitively, means that either everyone receives the output, or no one receives the output. Unfortunately, it has been shown by Cleve [4] that complete fairness is impossible in general when a majority of parties is not honest. Until recently, it was thought that no non-trivial functions could be computed with complete fairness without an honest majority. A recent result of Gordon et al. [10] , however, shows that this perception is wrong, at least in the two-party setting, and forces a re-evaluation of our current understanding of fairness.
Gordon et al. [10] deal exclusively with the case of two-party computation and leave open the question of fairness in the multi-party setting. Extending their work, we initiate a study of fairness in the setting of n > 2 parties, and demonstrate the first completely-fair protocols (for non-trivial functionalities) tolerating any t < n corrupted players. We stress that we are interested in obtaining complete fairness for certain functionalities, exactly as in the case of an honest majority. This is in contrast to work aimed at achieving weaker notions of partial fairness [5, 9, 2, 14, 7] (but for all functionalities). Our results assume the existence of a broadcast channel (or, equivalently, a PKI).
Although one could meaningfully ask what can be achieved in the absence of broadcast, we have chosen to assume broadcast so as to separate questions of fairness from questions of agreement.
Our first result shows that fairness can be obtained for some non-trivial functions for an arbitrary number of players n. Specifically, we show:
Theorem (Under suitable cryptographic assumptions) for any number of parties n there exists an O(n)-round protocol for securely computing boolean OR with complete fairness.
We stress that OR is a non-trivial function; in particular, Kilian et al. [12] show that OR is complete in the sense that black-box access to the OR functionality is sufficient for the secure computation of any other functionality (without complete fairness).
For our next result, we turn to a specific function of interest: boolean voting (or, equivalently, the majority function). Here, we are able to show a positive result only for the case n = 3:
Theorem (Under suitable cryptographic assumptions) there exists a protocol for securely computing the majority function for n = 3 with complete fairness.
Ishai et al. [11] also present a protocol for computing the voting functionality (for any n) without an honest majority. Their protocol, however, achieves only a weak notion of security when an honest majority is not present. (Indeed, their goal was to present a protocol that achieves the standard notion of security when an honest majority is present, and achieves some meaningful notion of security when this is not the case.) Specifically, when t parties are corrupted they can prove, informally, that a real execution of the protocol is as secure as an execution in the ideal world when the adversary is allowed to query the ideal functionality t + 1 times. We refer to their work for further explanation.
Our protocol for voting requires ω(log k) rounds, where k is the security parameter. Our final result shows that this is, in fact, optimal.
Theorem Any protocol for securely computing the majority function for n = 3 with complete fairness requires ω(log k) rounds.
Outline of the Paper
Standard notions of security for secure multi-party computation are reviewed in Appendix A. We stress that although the definitions are standard, what is non-standard is that we consider the definition of completely-fair secure computation even when we do not have an honest majority. We will refer to the weaker security definition, where dishonest parties are allowed to abort the computation even in the ideal world, as security with abort. When considering protocols that are secure with abort, will we assume that malicious parties can cause an abort only if P 1 is malicious [8] .
In Section 2 we describe our feasibility result for the case of boolean OR, and in Section 3 we show our protocol for computing the 3-party voting functionality. Our lower bound on the number of rounds required for completely-fair computing of voting is described in Section 4. Due to space limitations, most of the proofs have been deferred to the appendices.
Fair Computation of the OR Function for n Players
In this section we provide a protocol for securely computing the OR functionality with complete fairness for n parties, any t < n of whom may be corrupted. The basic idea behind the protocol is
Inputs: Let the inputs to OR be x 1 , . . . , x n , where x i ∈ {0, 1} Computation:
1. Let P be the set of all players. 2. Each player P i chooses random coins r i and uses a computationally-hiding commitment scheme to compute and broadcast c i = Com(x i , r i ). If some P i does not broadcast anything, all honest players output 1. Otherwise, let c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ). 3. All players P i ∈ P run an ideal computation (with abort) for ORWithVerify, where party P i uses (r i , x i , c) as its input. 4. Let P ∈ P be the player with the lowest index in P. If players receive ⊥ from the execution of ORWithVerify, they set P = P \ {P } and return to step 3. a 5. If players receive a set I of faulty players from the execution of ORWithVerify, they set P = P\I and return to step 3. 6. If players receive a binary output from the execution of ORWithVerify, they output this value and end the protocol.
a Recall we assume that only the player with the lowest index can abort. to have the parties securely compute OR with abort, and then recover in case an abort occurs. The key observation is that the dishonest players only learn something from this computation if they all hold input 0, since if any of the malicious players hold input 1 then they trivially know the result in advance. Therefore, if P 1 is corrupt and chooses to abort after receiving the output (but before allowing the honest parties to receive output) 1 , the honest parties can safely assume that his input is 0. They then exclude P 1 and restart the computation of OR with abort without him, which is equivalent (with respect to the output) to substituting a 0 for his input. The protocol is presented in Figure 1 . One technical detail that needs to be addressed in the above description is how we ensure that the malicious parties use the same inputs every time they restart the computation of OR with abort. To force this behavior, we begin the protocol by having every party broadcast a commitment to their input bit. Then, instead of computing a simple OR with abort, the parties compute the functionality ORWithVerify, described in 2. This functionality computes OR, but only after checking that all parties are still using the input values they originally committed to. To achieve this, in addition to providing their original inputs (and random coins), each party will also provide the list of commitments that they originally received from other players. If all players participate correctly, then all inputs will result in exactly those commitments. However, if any two parties disagree on the original commitments, or if any player's input does not result in the expected commitment, the functionality returns a list of all discrepancies, and the honest parties will discover a set of dishonest parties. They then restart the computation without those parties, which, again, is equivalent to substituting a 0 for their inputs. We proceed to give the formal statement and proof of our theorem.
Theorem 1 Assume
Com is a computationally-hiding commitment scheme, and that π securely computes ORWithVerify with abort. Then protocol Π 1 computes OR with complete fairness.
ORWithVerify
Inputs: Let the input of player P i be (x i , r i , c i ) where c i = (c i,1 , . . . , c i, ). For each party P j , determine its output as follows:
1. Say P i is inconsistent with P j if either (1) c i = c j or (2) Com(x i , r i ) = c j,i . (Note that this is not a symmetric relation.) 2. Let I j be the set of parties inconsistent with P j . 3. If there exist any parties inconsistent with each other, return I j as output to P j . Otherwise, return i x i to all parties. Proof: For any non-uniform, polynomial time adversary A in the hybrid world, we demonstrate a non-uniform polynomial-time adversary S corrupting the same parties as A and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing OR (with complete fairness), such that
.
For simplicity we assume Com is perfectly binding, though statistical binding suffices.
1. Initialize I to be the set of corrupted player, and let H = P \ I denote the honest players. For P j ∈ H, the simulator S creates a commitment c j to a random bit, and broadcasts c j to the corrupted parties. S then records the commitment c i broadcast by each corrupted P i . If any corrupted player fails to broadcast a value c i , then S submits 1's to the trusted party on behalf of all corrupted parties, and outputs whatever A outputs.
2. If I = ∅ then S submits 0's to the trusted party on behalf of all corrupted parties. Otherwise, S continues.
3. All players in I provide values (x i ,r i , c ) for an ideal computation of ORWithVerify. If S receives a binary output from ORWithVerify, it continues with Step 4. Otherwise, let P ∈ H∪I be the player with the lowest index in H ∪ I, and let I be the list of malicious players output by ORWithVerify:
(a) lf P ∈ I, the list I is given to P . If P aborts, S sets I = I \ {P }. If P does not abort, then S sets I = I \ I . In both cases, S returns to Step 2.
(b) if P / ∈ I, S sets I = I \ I and repeats step 2. (b) if b = 1, S gives the value 1 to A without querying the trusted party. If P / ∈ I, or if P does not choose to abort, then S submits all 1s to the trusted party and outputs whatever A outputs. If P ∈ I and P aborts, S sets I = I \ {P } and returns to step 2.
Fair Computation of Voting for Three Players
Players first compute the secure computation (with abort) that is described in ShareGen. This execution results in each player obtaining shares of a three-way secret sharing of three different bit sequences: (b 3 . In other words, in round i party P j sends a share of the value that the other parties should output if he ceases to participate in the next round. Notice that if all (or even just two) parties are honest, nobody can reconstruct any of the b (i) j values upon receiving P j 's share in round i. If P j does not send a valid, signed message in round i + 1, only then the other two players, who we refer to as P j+1 and P j−1 , exchange their own shares of b (i) j , and, using the share received from P j in the prior round, they reconstruct b (i) j and output the resulting bit. If all players act honestly, then in the final round they jointly reconstruct b
A few subtleties arise. One is that we must ensure that the values of b
are all outputs that are consistent with the inputs of P j−1 and P j+1 . In particular, if P j−1 and P j+1 have the same input value, then all values of b (i) j must be equal to this value. For example, we cannot allow it to occur (due to the correctness requirement) that when both of their inputs are 0, and P j aborts, they output 1. We provide the details of how these values are determined in protocoI ShareGen. Another difficult arises in the case that two parties are corrupted. Say, players P j−1 and P j+1 are both controlled by a malicious adversary, then the adversary will learn each value of b
To ensure that this extra information is unhelpful, we use the approach taken in [10] . A round i * is randomly selected according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 1/5, and the value of i * is kept hidden from the participants. In rounds i < i * the values of b (i) j reveal no information: they provide output that uses a randomly chosen input for player P j . In round i ≥ i * , the b (i) j will reveal the correct output. As we will demonstrate below, the biggest difficulty in proving security will be handling an adversary that happens to abort exactly in round i * : this adversary will learn the correct output in round i * , and then abort before the honest party learns the same value. The security of the protocol will rely on the fact that it is difficult for such an adversary to consistently and correctly identify round i * .
Theorem 2 Assume that (SigGen, Sig, Vrfy) is a secure digital signature scheme, and that π securely computes ShareGen with abort. Then Protocol Π 2 , with α = 1/5, securely computes Majority with complete fairness.
Proof: Note first that the protocol yields the correct output of f when all players are honest. This is because, with all but negligible probability, i * ≤ m, and b (m) j = Majority(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ). Note also that once the execution of ShareGen is complete, the rest of protocol Π 2 is symmetric. We refer the reader to [8] for more details, and simply note that protocols for secure computation with abort exist in which only P 1 has the ability to abort. Therefore, if P 1 is honest, we are assured that π completes successfully (though perhaps with substituted inputs for one or both of the other players if they aborted during its execution). It suffices, then, to prove, without loss of generality,
ShareGen
Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ {0, 1}. (If one of the received inputs is not in the correct domain, then a default value of 1 is used for that player.) The security parameter is k. Computation:
in the following way:
• Choose i * according to a geometric distribution with parameter α (see text).
• For i = 0 to i * − 1 and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} do:
* to m, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} set b
j|3 as random three-way shares of b
j|2 are random and b
j . For i = 0, we will always let the share b j|j+1 at random such that b
l|j ). Output:
and public key pk. that Π 2 is secure when P 1 alone is corrupt, and when both P 1 and P 2 are corrupted. The following two claims and their proofs will therefore prove our theorem. In what follows, we drop the matter of signatures to simplify reading. We assume that the simulator in both claims will send signed messages and will verify received messages. When we say a corrupted player aborts, this includes the case where he sends an incorrectly signed message.
Claim 1 For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P 1 and running Π 2 in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort), there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P 1 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing f (with complete fairness), such that
Proof: The proof of Claim 1 is similar to and simpler than the proof of Claim 2 that follows. We leave the proof of Claim 1 to Appendix B.
Claim 2 For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P 1 and P 2 and running Π 2 in a hybrid model with access to an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort), and one computing OR without abort, there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary S corrupting P 1 and P 2 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing f (with complete fairness), such that
Inputs: Party P i has input x i ∈ {0, 1}. The security parameter is k. The protocol:
1. Preliminary phase: Parties P 1 , P 2 and P 3 run an ideal execution with abort for ShareGen, where P 1 can abort if he is malicious. Each player uses their respective inputs, x 1 , x 2 and x 3 , and security parameter k. z (a) If players receive ⊥, P 1 is "blamed" (see text), and P 2 and P 3 run an ideal computation with complete fairness for OR (see section 2). (Note that this is equivalent to using a substituted input value of 1 for P 1 .) Otherwise:
(b) Denote the output of P j from ShareGen by (b
and pk.
For
Player broadcast:
(a) All three players simultaneously broadcast: P j sends (b
j|j ) (b) Players verify each others' broadcasted shares using pk. Invalid signatures are treated as though the sending party aborted the protocol.
(c) If (only) P j failed to send a valid message:
i. P j+1 and P j−1 respectively broadcast their shares: (b
ii. Each player verifies that the message sent by the other is valid. Invalid messages are treated as an abort. If one player aborts, the remaining honest player outputs their own input value. Otherwise, P j−1 and P j+1 both output b and verify as in step 2b. If P j aborts or sends a bad message, P j−1 and P j+1 proceed as in step 2c, and output the resulting value. If two players abort, the remaining honest player outputs its input value as in step 2d. Proof: The proof in this case is subtle, and the simulator S will be more complex than the one described in Appendix B. The difficulty now is that P 1 and P 2 will learn the value of b (i) 3 in round i, which will yield some information about the input of P 3 . Note, very much like in the proof of security found in [10] , the complication arises because the adversary might abort in round i * , after learning the correct output, but before P 3 has generated correct output. For ease of explanation in what follows, we will sometimes refer to the actions or views of P 1 and P 2 , when more formally we mean the action of A on behalf of those parties.
By symmetry of the protocol, we will assume that P 1 aborts before P 2 . To make this assumption, we will have to consider inputs (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 1) independently from inputs (x 1 , x 2 ) = (1, 0). We proceed with the description of S.
0. If in any of the following, S receives a forged signature from P 1 , S outputs fail and ends the simulation.
1. S receives x 1 and x 2 from P 1 and P 2 respectively. If x 1 / ∈ {0, 1} (resp. x 2 / ∈ {0, 1}) S continues the simulation setting x 1 = 1 (resp. x 2 = 1).
2. S runs (sk, pk) ← SigGen(1 k ), generates random shares:
) and sends these and pk to A. If P 1 aborts, then Sextracts x 2 from P 2 , as intended for the ideal OR functionality, and sends (1, x 2 ) to the trusted party.
3. If P 1 (and thus P 2 ) has not yet aborted, S picks a value i * according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = . In what follows, for ease of description, we will use x 1 and x 2 when in fact we mean x 1 and x 2 , remembering, of course that A could have used substituted inputs. He then sends b
For simplicity, from here forward, we will say that A received b in round i (or, equivalently
5. If P 1 aborts in round i < i * , then S setsx 2 = x 2 , and assigns a value tox 1 according to the following rules that depend on the values of (x 1 , x 2 ) and on the value of b Note that when
3 = x 1 . S now finishes the simulation as follows. (d) Ifx 1 =x 2 , then S submits (x 1 ,x 2 ) to the trusted party. Denote the output it receives from the trusted party by
to P 2 , and outputs whatever A outputs.
(e) Ifx 1 =x 2 , then S sends b out = b (i−1) 1 =x 1 =x 2 to P 2 before sending anything to the trusted party. If P 2 aborts, it sends (0, 1) to the trusted party. Otherwise, it sends (x 1 ,x 2 ) to the trusted party. In both cases it outputs whatever A outputs. 6 . In round i * :
(a) If x 1 = x 2 , S submits (x 1 , x 2 ) to the trusted party. Denote the value he receives by
(b) If x 1 = x 2 , he simply sets b out = x 1 = x 2 without querying the trusted party and continues (note that in this case, b out = f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) even though S did not query the trusted party).
7. In rounds i * , . . . , m, S sends b out to A. If A aborts P 1 and P 2 simultaneously, S submits (1, 0) to the trusted party (if he hasn't already done so in step 6a). If A aborts P 1 (alone), S sets b
= b out and sends the final share, b
(a) If x 1 = x 2 , then S has already sent (x 1 , x 2 ) to the trusted party. He simply outputs whatever A outputs and ends the simulation.
(b) If x 1 = x 2 , and P 2 does not abort, S sends (x 1 , x 2 ) to the trusted party. If P 2 does abort, S sends (0, 1) to the trusted party. In both cases he then outputs whatever A outputs.
In the interest of saving space, we refer the reader to Appendix C for the analysis of S.
A Lower Bound on the Round Complexity of Voting
We prove here that any 3-party protocol for voting requiresω(log(n)) rounds. In our proof, we use a constraint from the ideal world to demonstrate that the last round of the protocol is "unnecessary". We then apply the argument a logarithmic number of times to obtain a protocol that reveals the correct output without any message exchange, yielding a contradiction. As we will see, the argument cannot be applied more than a logarithmic number of times, so the proof will not rule out polynomial-round protocols (such as the one demonstrated in Section 3).
The ideal world constraint that we use for our proof relates to an adversary's ability with respect to two different goals: guessing the honest party's input, and biasing the output away from that value. If an adversary that controls two parties submits inputs (0, 1) or (1, 0) to the trusted party, he can guess the honest party's input with probability 1, as the output in this case is always the same as the honest input. However, for the same reason, the probability that he biases the output away from the honest input is 0. If, on the other hand, the adversary submits (0, 0) or (1, 1), then in interacting with an honest player that chooses input at random, he will bias the output against the honest input with probability 1 2 . Now, however, he obtains no information about the honest input, and the probability that he guesses its value is at most 1 2 . In both cases, the sum of these probabilities is 1.
Under the assumption that a secure, completely fair, O(log k) round protocol for voting exists, we demonstrate a real world adversary that either breaks the ideal world constraint mentioned above (contradicting the assumption that the protocol is secure), or it allows us to prove that the last message of the protocol is unnecessary. Before describing the adversary, we first reintroduce some notation, and formalize the above mentioned constraints.
The notation is the same as that used in Section 3, but we review it here so that the section is self-contained. We assume there exists a secure, completely fair 3-party protocol for voting, and since much of our proof is symmetric (though not necessarily the protocol itself), we refer to the players as P j−1 , P j and P j+1 , each respectively holding inputs x j−1 , x j and x j+1 . Our proof then will be applied for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where addition is modulo 3. We denote by b (i) j the value output by P j−1 and P j+1 when the last message sent by P j is in round i. Similarly, we denote by b
j+1 ) the value output by P j and P j+1 (resp. P j and P j−1 ) when the last message sent by P j−1 (resp. P j+1 ) is in round i.
Theorem 3 Any protocol Π that securely computes Majority for three parties with complete fairness requires r = ω(log k) rounds.
We begin the proof by demonstrating the following ideal world constraint.
Claim 3 For all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and any ideal-world adversary A controlling parties P j−1 and P j+1 it holds that Pr [A outputs
where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of A and random choice of x j ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof:
We begin by letting equal be the event that an ideal-world adversary A submits two equal inputs (i.e., x j−1 = x j+1 ) to the trusted party. It is easy to see that
since when equal occurs the adversary learns nothing about the value of x j . Also,
since the only way output j = x j can occur is if A submits x j−1 = x j+1 =x j to the trusted party. The claim is proved by summing these two probabilities:
This ideal-world constraint results in the following real-world constraint. For all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, any inverse polynomial µ(n), and any adversary A controlling players P j−1 and P j+1
Pr [A outputs
for n sufficiently large. Consider now the following real world adversary A i running a completelyfair, r(n)-round protocol for voting. A i corrupts P j−1 and P j+1 (for any j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) and randomly chooses inputs x j−1 , x j+1 subject to the constraint x j−1 = x j+1 . Then:
• A i runs the protocol honestly until he receives a round i message from player P j (but does not yet send any round i messages).
• A i locally computes the value of b (i) j as though P j aborted:
j = x j−1 , A i aborts P j−1 without sending his round i message and continues the protocol (honestly) on behalf of P j+1 until the end. Note that P j outputs b
, A i aborts P j+1 without sending his round i message and continues the protocol (honestly) on behalf of P j−1 until the end. Note that P j outputs b
j+1 .
• A i outputs b
We use this adversary and the constraint of Equation (1) to prove the following claim.
Claim 4 Fix µ and n such that Equation (1) holds, and let µ = µ(n). Say that there exists an i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ r(n), such that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all inputs (x j−1 , x j , x j+1 ) it holds that:
Then for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all inputs (x j−1 , x j , x j+1 ) it holds that:
Proof: We first note that when x j−1 = x j = x j+1 , the claim follows trivially by the correctness and fairness properties of the protocol. P j−1 and P j+1 , for example, must output Majority regardless of when P j aborts. So we assume that some two inputs differ. Without loss of generality, we will say that x j−1 = x j+1 . We begin by analyzing the probability that A i outputs x j , as well as the probability that P j outputsx j . Recall that in the description of A i , we state that A i chooses inputs x j−1 = x j+1 , which is also our assumption here. We leave that assumption implicit from here forward.
where the last equality holds because when x j−1 = x j+1 , x j = Majority(x j−1 , x j , x j+1 ), and the inequality follows from the assumption in our claim (equation 2). We now compute the probability that P j does not output its own vote, x j .
From the constraint in equation 1, we know that the sum of equations 4 and 5 is bounded by 1 + µ:
Furthermore, if x j = x j+1 , then by correctness and fairness of the protocol, Pr b
Following the same argument as above, we also have:
and when x j−1 = x j , we have by the correctness and fairness properties that Pr b
Therefore, under the assumption of Equation (2) and that x j−1 = x j+1 , regardless of the value of x j , it follows that Pr b
Pr b
To see this, note that if x j−1 = x j+1 , either x j−1 = x j or x j+1 = x j . In the first case, we can redefine the adversary A i to corrupt parties P j−1 and P j , and in the second case we redefine it to corrupt P j+1 and P j . The rest of the argument is completely symmetric, and both cases leads to the required conclusion. This completes the proof of the claim.
We now use Claim 2 to complete the proof of the theorem. Let p(n) = 5 r(n) , and µ(n) = 3/4p(n). For sufficiently large n, by the assumed correctness of Π, Claim 2 holds when i = r(n). We can therefore apply the claim r(n) times to conclude that for all inputs (x j−1 , x j , x j+1 ), and all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Pr b
which implies that for any inputs, any two players can correctly compute the correct output of Π without ever interacting with the third player. This is clearly impossible, and we conclude that no such protocol Π exists.
A Standard Definitions

A.1 Preliminaries
A function µ(·) is negligible if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large n it holds that µ(n) < 1/p(n). A distribution ensemble X = {X(a, n)} a∈Dn, n∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by a ∈ D n and n ∈ N, where D n is a set that may depend on n. (Looking ahead, n will be the security parameter and D n will denote the domain of the parties' inputs.) Two distribution ensembles X = {X(a, n)} a∈Dn, n∈N and Y = {Y (a, n)} a∈Dn, n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c ≡ Y , if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for every n and every a ∈ D n Pr[D (X(a, n) 
The statistical difference between two distributions X(a, n) and Y (a, n) is defined as
where the sum ranges over s in the support of either X(a, n) or Y (a, n). Two distribution ensembles X = {X(a, n)} a∈Dn, n∈N and Y = {Y (a, n)} a∈Dn, n∈N are statistically close, denoted X s ≡ Y , if there is a negligible function µ(·) such that for every n and every a ∈ D n , it holds that SD X(a, n), Y (a, n) ≤ µ(n).
A.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation with Complete Fairness
Multi-party computation. A multi-party protocol for parties P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } and computing a functionality F = {f n }, with f n = (f 1 n , . . . , f m n ), is a protocol satisfying the following functional requirement: if all parties hold the same value n, and P i begins by holding input x i ∈ X i n , then at the conclusion of the protocol party P i obtains f i n (x 1 , . . . , x m ; r) for a uniformly-chosen random string r, with all but negligible probability (in n).
In what follows, we define what we mean by a secure protocol. Our definition follows the standard definition of [8] (based on [9, 13, 1, 3] ), except that we require complete fairness even though we are in the two-party setting. (Thus, our definition is equivalent to the one in [8] for the case of an honest majority, even though we will not have an honest majority.) We consider active adversaries, who may deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner, and static corruptions.
Security of protocols (informal).
The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in a real protocol execution to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the above-described ideal computation.
Execution in the ideal model. The parties are P = {P 1 , . . . , P m }, and there is an adversary A who has corrupted some subset I ⊂ P of them. An ideal execution for the computation of F = {f n } proceeds as follows:
Inputs: All players P i hold the same value of n, and their inputs x i ∈ X i n . The adversary A receives an auxiliary input z.
Send inputs to trusted party:
The honest parties send their inputs to the trusted party. A may substitute any set of (coordinated)values for the corrupted parties that it controls and sends them to the trusted party. Denote the values sent to the trusted party byx .
Trusted party sends outputs: If x i ∈ X i n the trusted party sets x =x i for some default valuê x i . Then, the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random and sends f i n (x ; r) to P i .
Outputs:
The honest parties output whatever they were sent by the trusted party, the corrupted parties output nothing, and A outputs any arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view.
We let ideal F ,A(z) (x, y, n) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary and the output of the honest parties following an execution in the ideal model as described above.
Execution in the real model. We next consider the real model in which a multi-party protocol π is executed by P (and there is no trusted party). In this case, the adversary A gets the inputs of the corrupted parties and sends all messages on behalf of these parties, using an arbitrary polynomial-time strategy. The honest parties follow the instructions of π. Let F be as above and let π be a multi-party protocol computing F. Let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let real π,A(z) (x, y, n) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest parties, following an execution of π where all parties begin by holding n, and P i begins by holding and input x i .
Security as emulation of an ideal execution in the real model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated as follows:
Definition 4 Let F be as above. Protocol π is said to securely compute F with complete fairness if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that
A.3 Secure Multi-Party Computation With Abort
This definition is the standard one for secure multi-party computation without an honest majority [8] in that it allows early abort; i.e., the adversary may receive its own outputs even though the honest parties do not. We again let P = {P 1 , . . . P m } denote the parties, and consider an adversary A who has corrupted a subset I ⊂ P of them. The only change from the definition in Section A.2 is with regard to the ideal model for computing F = {f n }, which is now defined as follows:
Inputs: As previously.
Send inputs to trusted party: As previously.
Trusted party sends output to corrupted party: If for some i, x i ∈ X i n , the trusted party sets x i =x i for some default valuex i . Otherwise, the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random and computes z i = f i n (x ; r) If P 1 is corrupted, then for every party P i that is corrupted, the trusted party sends z i to this party (i.e., to the adversary A). If P 1 is honest, then the trusted party sends z i to every party.
Adversary decides whether to abort: If P 1 is dishonest, then after receiving its output (as described above), the adversary A either sends abort or continue to the trusted party. In the former case the trusted party sends ⊥ to all honest parties, and in the latter case the trusted party sends z j to P j .
Outputs: As previously.
We let ideal abort F ,A(z) (x, n) be the random variable consisting of the output of the adversary and the output of the honest parties following an execution in the ideal model as described above.
Definition 5 Let F be a functionality, and let π be a protocol computing F. Protocol π is said to securely compute F with abort if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that
A.4 The Hybrid Model
The hybrid model combines both the real and ideal models. Specifically, an execution of a protocol π in the hybrid model for some ideal functionality G involves the parties sending regular messages to each other (as in the real model). However, in addition, the parties have access to a trusted party computing G. The parties communicate with this trusted party in exactly the same way as in the ideal models described above; the question of which ideal model is taken (that with or without abort) must be specified. In this paper, we will always consider a hybrid model where the functionality G is computed according to the ideal model with abort. Let G be a functionality and let π be a multi-party protocol that includes real messages between the parties, and ideal subroutine calls to G. Let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input z. We let hybrid G π,A(z) (x, n) be the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest parties, following an execution of π (with ideal calls to G) where all players begin by holding n, and P i begins by holding input x i .
The hybrid model gives a powerful tool for proving the security of protocols. Specifically, it enables us to construct a protocol π for securely computing some functionality F, while using a subprotocol that securely computes G. Furthermore, it is possible to analyze the security of π considering an ideal execution of G (rather than a real protocol that securely computes it). We denote by π the protocol that uses ideal calls to G and by π ρ the composed protocol where sequential calls to G are replaced by sequential executions of the real protocol ρ. (Sequentiality here means that while a given execution of ρ is being run, no other messages are sent.) This is summarized in the following theorem, a close variant of which was proved in [3] .
Theorem 6 Let ρ be a protocol that securely computes G with abort, and let π be a protocol that securely computes F with complete fairness when given access to a trusted party who computes G for the parties (according to the ideal model with abort). Then, the protocol π ρ securely computes F with complete fairness.
B Proof of Claim 1
Notice that the view of P 1 in the hybrid world reveals nothing until the final round of the protocol. In particular, the output it receives from ShareGen is independent of all inputs, and contains nothing but random bits and signatures on these bits. The shares sent in the intermediate rounds have this same property. We now provide a simulator S.
1. S receives input x 1 from P 1 intended for trusted functionality ShareGen. If x 1 / ∈ {0, 1}, S sets x 1 = 1 and continues the simulation as though P 1 's input is 1.
2. S runs (pk, sk) ← SigGen(1 k ), creates random shares (b
3|1 ) , and gives these and pk to P 1 . If P 1 aborts, S submits 1 to the trusted party for f and outputs whatever P 1 outputs.
3. S picks a value i * according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = to the trusted party and outputs whatever P 1 outputs.
(b) If P 1 aborts in round i > i * , then S submits x 1 to the trusted party of f , and outputs whatever P 1 outputs. 3|3 such that, together with the shares given to P 1 at the beginning of the simulation, for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, b
If
He gives these shares to P 1 , and outputs whatever he outputs.
Due to the security of the underlying signature scheme, the probability that S outputs fail is negligible in k. Note that the view of P 1 is otherwise identical in both worlds. This is because the shares are independent of all inputs; they are random values whether generated by S or by the trusted functionality for ShareGen. We only have to argue, therefore, that the other two players output identically distributed values in both worlds when P 1 aborts (if P 1 never aborts, then clearly the simulation is successful). We break our analysis into the following cases:
• If P 1 gives incorrect input in either step 1 of the simulation or step 1 of the protocol in the hybrid world, then in both worlds, signed shares are created with a default value of 1 in place of its actual input. The rest of the protocol and simulation then proceed as though this were the value submitted to ShareGen.
• If P 1 aborts in Step 2, then S submits (1, x 2 ) to the trusted party, and the output of P 2 and P 3 is Majority(1, x 2 , x 3 ) = OR(x 2 , x 3 ). In the hybrid world, they execute an ideal computation of the OR functionality. It follows that the joint distribution over the view of A and the outputs of P 2 and P 3 is the same in both worlds. In the following cases, we assume that P 1 aborts after the simulation of ShareGen is complete, in round i of the message exchange.
• If x 2 = x 3 In the ideal world, the value sent by S to the trusted party is irrelevant when x 2 = x 3 . The honest parties both output f (1,
In the hybrid world, both P 2 and P 3 output b
(Note that this relies on the properties of our particular functionality.)
For i ≤ i * , in both worlds the output of P 2 and P 3 is
3 ) = 0 with probability 1 2 f (1, x 2 , x 3 ) = 1 with probability
by both the specification of ShareGen and the description of S. For i > i * , in the hybrid world, b
, which is exactly what P 2 and P 3 receive in the ideal world, since S submits x 1 in round i * .
C Completing the Proof of Claim 2
We first note that the probability S outputs fail is negligible, due to the security of the underling signature scheme. We state the following claim:
Claim 5 If P 1 and P 2 both abort, then S always sends (0, 1) or (1, 0) to the trusted party.
We leave verification to the reader. We must prove that for any set of fixed inputs, the joint distribution over the possible views of A and the output of P 3 is equal in the ideal and hybrid worlds:
We begin by noting that this is trivially true when no players ever abort. It is also easy to verify that this is true when P 1 aborts during the execution of ShareGen. We therefore assume that A aborts player P 1 at some point after the execution of ShareGen. We will break up the view of A into two parts: the view before P 1 aborts, where a particular instance of this view is denoted by a i , and the single message intended for P 2 that A receives after P 1 aborts, denoted by b
. Letting i denote the round in which P 1 aborts, and b out the value output by P 3 , we wish to prove:
(we drop explicit mention of the inputs to improve readability). Towards proving this, we first prove the following two claims.
Claim 6
For all fixed inputs and all feasible adversarial views ( a i , b
We denote by P ⊥ 2 the event that P 2 aborts the protocol (either at the same time as P 1 , or after P 1 aborts, during the exchange of the shares of b
). We also replace the event
) i > i * by E hyb , and the event view ideal = ( a i , b
) i > i * by E ideal in order to shorten notation. We have the following:
E hyb · Pr P The above two equalities hold because the protocol is designed such that any view a i occurs with the same probability in both worlds. Furthermore, given that i > i * , it holds that b (i−1) 1 = f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), independent of a i . P 2 decides whether to abort based only on these two variables, so the decision is the same in both worlds. We therefore need only to prove that Pr out hyb = b out | P ) i > i * (10) Both equations follow easily again from the protocol and simulator descriptions. To see Equation 9 , note that in the hybrid world when both P 1 and P 2 abort, P 3 always outputs his own input, b out = x 3 . In the ideal world, recall from claim 5 that anytime P 1 and P 2 both abort, and in particular in round i > i * , S submits either (0, 1) or (1, 0) to the trusted party, resulting in b out = x 3 . For Equation 10 , note that in the hybrid world when P 1 aborts in round i > i * , and P 2 does not, P 3 outputs b out = f (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ). In the ideal world, this is also true, as S submits (x 1 , x 2 ) to the trusted party (either in step 6a or in step 7b).
We proceed now to the more difficult claim, in the case when i ≤ i * :
Claim 7 For all fixed inputs, for all outputs b out , and for all feasible adversarial views ( a i , b We proceed now to do this by looking at every possible set of inputs (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ).
If 
3 is always x 1 . When P 1 aborts in the ideal world, in accordance with step 5a, S choosesx 1 = x 1 = x 2 with probability 
